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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effect of ownership concentration and controlling shareholder 
on firm performance with evidence from listed-Malaysian firms. Five research question 
are investigated: (1) What is the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance; (2) What is the relationship between controlling shareholders and firm 
performance; (3) What is the relationship between board size and firm performance; (4) 
What is the relationship between firm size and firm performance; and (5) What is the 
relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and firm performance. Two measurement of 
firm performance are used: Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TQ). In the theory 
review, corporate governance theory and principal-agent theory are introduces as 
theoretical foundation. Corporate governance theory discusses the principal-agent 
problem and model of corporation (stockholder and shareholder model). Ownership 
structure is believed to affect firm performance, thus different arguments related to the 
effect of ownership concentration and owner characteristics on firm performance are 
reviewed. In regards to the methodology, five testable hypotheses are generated for 
empirical analyses using panel data on 150 firms over five years from 2008 to 2012. 
Simple statistics analysis and regression analysis are combined: simple statistics analysis 
used descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to analyze firm’s characteristics; 
regression analysis applies OLS regression to test the effect of ownership concentration 
and controlling shareholder on firm performance. Finally, the research question are 
answered: ownership concentration has positive effect, while controlling shareholders has 
negative effects on firm performance. It is found that ownership has a positive effect on 
ROA and TQ, but the results are insignificant; thus the results concluded that ownership 
concentration has not effect on firm performance. The effect of controlling shareholder 
on firm performance exhibit a negative results. Thus, the results concluded that the 
positive and negative effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance depends 
upon the size and characteristics of the large shareholders. 
 
Keywords: Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, Controlling Shareholders, Firm 
Performance, Ownership Concentration 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kertas ini mengkaji kesan kepekatan pemilikan dan pemegang saham mengawal prestasi 
firma dengan bukti daripada firma-firma yang disenaraikan - Malaysia. Lima soalan 
penyelidikan disiasat : (1) Apakah hubungan di antara kepekatan pemilikan dan prestasi 
firma; (2) Apakah hubungan di antara pemegang saham dan mengawal prestasi firma; (3) 
Apakah hubungan di antara saiz papan dan prestasi firma; (4) Apakah hubungan antara 
saiz firma dan prestasi firma; dan (5) Apakah hubungan antara nisbah hutang kepada 
ekuiti dan prestasi firma. Dua pengukuran prestasi firma digunakan: Pulangan ke atas 
Aset (ROA) dan Tobin Q (TQ). Dalam kajian teori, teori urus tadbir korporat dan teori 
utama-ejen adalah memperkenalkan sebagai asas teori. Teori tadbir urus korporat 
membincangkan masalah utama-ejen dan model perbadanan (pemegang saham dan 
model pemegang saham). Struktur hak milik dipercayai memberi kesan prestasi firma, 
hujah-hujah itu berbeza berkaitan dengan kesan kepekatan pemilikan dan ciri-ciri pemilik 
kepada prestasi firma dikaji semula. Berkenaan dengan metodologi, Lima hipotesis diuji 
dihasilkan untuk analisis empirikal menggunakan data panel di 150 syarikat selama Lima 
tahun dari 2008 hingga 2012. Mudah analisis statistik dan analisis regresi digabungkan: 
statistik sederhana analisis menggunakan statistik deskriptif dan analisis korelasi untuk 
menganalisis ciri-ciri firma; analisis regresi berlaku OLS regresi untuk menguji kesan 
kepekatan pemilikan dan pemegang saham pengendali kepada prestasi firma. Akhirnya, 
persoalan kajian dijawab: kepekatan pemilikan mempunyai kesan positif, sementara 
mengendalikan pemegang saham mempunyai kesan negatif ke atas prestasi firma. Ia 
didapati bahawa pemilikan mempunyai kesan positif ke atas ROA dan TQ, tetapi 
hasilnya tidak penting; sehingga keputusan menyimpulkan bahawa kepekatan pemilikan 
tidak memberi kesan ke atas prestasi firma. Kesan dari pemegang saham yang mengawal 
di pameran prestasi firma hasil negatif. Oleh itu, keputusan menyimpulkan bahawa kesan 
positif dan negatif mengawal pemegang saham mengenai prestasi firma bergantung 
kepada saiz dan ciri-ciri pemegang saham besar. 
 
Kata Kunci: Teori Utama-Ejen, Urus Tadbir Korporat, Pemegang Saham Pengendali, 
Pencapaian Firm, Pemilikan Konsentrasi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background of the Study 
Competition is becoming fiercer among the firms as the world becomes more globalized. 
The reduction in the trade barriers as well as innovation in technology and 
communication have redefined the international competition and new economic powers 
emerged in the global markets. Over the past three decades, global economic integration 
has becomes the root of Malaysian achievement in a growing economy. Malaysia has 
been one of the fastest developing economies in the world as it opened its markets with 
lowered tariffs and alleviated foreign investment requirements. It is importance for 
Malaysia firms to reform their financial performance as the competition becomes tougher 
in global and local market, where profitability may allow firms to overcome the 
limitation of their local markets in order to reach their maximum potential. This 
enhancement will give positive competition among the firms as well to the country’s 
economy as a whole.  
A business environment surrounded by forces of the legal, regulatory, financial, and 
institutional system of a country have an impact on the firm performance. Globalization 
increases market prospective, trade and investment as well as the availability of the firm 
resources. However, globalization increases market opportunities of the firms as well as 
the competition faced by firms. Three decades ago, a new firm might probably has 
difficulty in borrowing money from domestic banks, especially manufacturing industry 
(Hausler, 2002). Today, due to globalization, firms have more options to choose their 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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